Clinical Psychology
0. Big Picture
Clinical psychology = diagnosing and treating psychological disorders. 5 disorders: schizophrenia · mood disorders · impulse control disorders · anxiety & fear-related disorders · OCD.
| Approach | Asks… | Used for |
|---|---|---|
| Biological | neurotransmitter imbalance? genes? (brain scans, blood tests) | drug therapy, ECT |
| Cognitive | faulty / irrational information processing? | CBT, REBT, cognitive restructuring |
| Learning (behaviourist) | classical & operant conditioning? | desensitisation, ERP, covert sensitisation |
| Social / psychodynamic | environment, trauma, unconscious conflict? | talking therapies |
An interactionist view (biology + environment, e.g. inherited predisposition + trauma trigger) is often the most sensible.
6.1 Schizophrenia
① Diagnostic criteria (ICD-11)
Psychotic disorders = major break from reality (person perceives the world very differently from others). Schizophrenia = a very severe psychotic disorder; disturbances in thoughts, feelings, experience & behaviour.
- Persistent delusions – beliefs not based in reality (e.g. someone is trying to harm you)
- Persistent hallucinations – sensory experiences w/o stimulus; mostly auditory (hearing voices) or visual
- Thought disorder – can't think (and so speak) in an organised way
- Experiences of influence, passivity or control – belief thoughts/actions are controlled by something external
- Avolition – lack of motivation
- Flattened affect – blunted emotional expression (less outward facial expression etc.)
- Impaired cognitive function – reduced memory / attention
- Catatonia – lack of movement or speech
Positive symptom = experience 'in addition to' / 'distortion of' normal experience (delusions = distorted thinking; hallucinations = distorted perception). Negative symptom = level of functioning/experience falls below normal (avolition = motivation lower than normal; flattened affect = less emotion expressed than expected).
Types of delusion
| Type | Strongly held belief that… | e.g. |
|---|---|---|
| Persecutory | you are in danger / conspired against / others pursue you to harm you | "they're out to get me" |
| Grandiose | you have special abilities or powers | "I am a superhero" |
| Reference | events in the environment relate to you | TV programme is talking about me |
All are beliefs fully believed despite strong evidence to contradict.
Early-onset = disorder starts at a significantly younger age than average (schizophrenia is normally early adulthood; here symptoms began before age 18).
Core study 1 (a boy): from age 10 academic studies + behaviour declined; parents divorced → moved in with grandparents, changed schools. From age 12 heard voices; later believed mother & others were communicating with the voices. Erratic behaviour, shouted at people who weren't there, muttered to himself, barely slept, self-care declined badly. Admitted to hospital several times, given a range of medications → diagnosed with early-onset schizophrenia; released on medication that controlled aggression. But still had negative symptoms: apathy, social withdrawal, refused school.
Evaluation (research methods): case study → lots of detail (qual + quant), deeper insight, ↑ validity. ✗ can't generalise (one person), can't replicate (no two situations same). Issue: using children in research – harder to give fully informed consent (parents must consent too), need extra protection from harm, may not understand right to withdraw / how to express feelings.
② Key study: Freeman et al. (2003) — VR & persecutory ideation
Freeman, Slater, Bebbington, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler… & Vinayagamoorthy (2003). Can virtual reality be used to investigate persecutory ideation? J. Nervous & Mental Disease, 191(8), 509–514.
Virtual reality (VR) = computer-generated simulation; person uses goggles + screen/gloves to interact with a 3-D environment. 1990s–2000s: new tech, first used for spatial awareness, cognitive skills & social interaction → then found useful for treating phobias & anxiety (Rothbaum et al. 2000 – exposure therapy, fear of flying; Slater et al. 1999 – public speaking, avatars elicit anxiety).
Persecutory ideation = belief (without evidence) that others are hostile / want to hurt you. One of the most common schizophrenia symptoms → social withdrawal, fear of others. Hard to understand in schizophrenia because the disorder is complex → use VR to study it in people without schizophrenia → better understanding → better ways to help patients cope.
Aims: ① do people with no history of mental illness have persecutory thoughts in VR? ② are there cognitive/emotional factors that predict it? Hypothesis: a few would have persecutory thoughts, and these would have higher emotional distress & paranoia.
- Sample: 24 (12 M, 12 F), students/admin staff of University College London, mean age 26, no history of mental illness; volunteer sampling (answered an advert).
- Procedure: trained to use VR kit → enter virtual library scene for 5 min. Not told study was about persecution; just explore + form an impression of the people & what they think of you. 5 avatars (3 at one desk, 2 at another) with ambiguous behaviour (smiling, looking, talking to each other).
- Measures after VR: Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) – 53-item self-report, 9 symptom dimensions over last 7 days (interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, psychoticism…); anxiety questionnaire (20 items, scale 1–4); paranoia; 'sense of presence'; specific persecution ideations. Mainly closed numerical questions.
- Control for priming: half (equal M/F) did questionnaires before AND after VR (questionnaires might prime persecutory thoughts). Semi-structured interviews on thoughts & feelings about the VR.
Interpersonal sensitivity = tendency to focus on feelings of personal inadequacy/inferiority + marked discomfort in interpersonal interactions.
- Sig. correlation between paranoia-questionnaire score and the paranoia score given from the interview.
- For the most part participants had positive opinions of avatars, but some had persecutory ideas. e.g. "they were talking about me behind my back": 11 did not agree, 8 a little, 3 moderately, 2 totally.
- No sig. differences in persecution scores between males/females, or between those with questionnaires only after vs before + after.
- Predictors: persecutory thoughts about avatars did NOT sig. correlate with paranoia score; higher interpersonal sensitivity and higher anxiety were sig. correlated with higher persecutory thoughts in VR.
Conclusion: people do attribute mental states to VR characters — usually positive, but can be persecutory. More likely to show persecutory ideation if high interpersonal sensitivity or anxiety.
| 'Positive' statements (Table 6.1) | 'Negative' statements |
|---|---|
| 'Friendly people just being friendly and offering a smile'; 'People were nicer than real people'; 'It was nice when they smiled' | 'They were very ignorant and unfriendly'; 'They were telling me to go away'; 'The two women looked more threatening'; 'Some were intimidating' |
Strengths: standardised VR programme ⇒ ↑ reliability · numerical scales + semi-structured interviews = quantitative + qualitative data (stats + detail) · control (half did questionnaires before + after) ↑ validity – questionnaires themselves not eliciting persecution · equal M/F ⇒ no gender bias · ethical: consent, right to withdraw, debrief.
Weaknesses: simulated environment ⇒ ↓ ecological validity · self-report ⇒ response bias · small sample (24), all from one university ⇒ not representative, ↓ generalisability · high-anxiety / interpersonal-sensitivity participants could be distressed ⇒ a full debrief essential (protection from harm).
Application to everyday life: ✓ helps us understand factors predicting persecutory ideation; VR can be used again to measure similar experiences. ✗ but it's VR, not real life – shows how people interpret avatars, can't tell us for certain how they'd respond in real life.
③ Explanations of schizophrenia
A. Biological — Genetic
Genes (or combinations of genes) are passed to offspring and may cause the disorder. 3 ways to investigate:
| Method | What it does |
|---|---|
| Family study | are biological relatives of someone with the disorder more likely than non-relatives to be similarly affected? Close relatives share more genes ⇒ more risk |
| Twin study | compares concordance in MZ (identical, 100% DNA) vs DZ (non-identical, ~50% DNA) twins. Allows nature vs nurture to be studied |
| Adoption study | adopted child vs biological parent (not raised by them) ⇒ truly separates genes from environment – family & twin studies can't |
- Gottesman (1991): risk of developing schizophrenia = 1% general population → 48% if you have an identical twin with it.
- Hilker et al. (2017): twin study, 30 000+ twin pairs in Denmark (Danish Twin Register + Danish Psychiatric Central Research Register), included related disorders ⇒ heritability = 79%.
- Tienari et al. (2000): adoption study – schizophrenia in 6.7% of adoptees whose biological mother had it vs just 4% of controls (adoptees of mothers without it).
B. Biological — Biochemical (the dopamine hypothesis)
Neurotransmitter = chemical messenger enabling communication between neurons; it crosses a small junction called the synapse. Neurons using dopamine may fire too often or send too much information. Excess dopamine in the Broca's region (language formation) ⇒ impaired logical speech (classic symptom).
Evidence:
- Drug trials (give different drugs to groups & compare): amphetamines & cocaine ↑ dopamine ⇒ more hallucinations/delusions; in schizophrenia they make symptoms worse. L-dopa (synthetic dopamine for Parkinson's) in too-high dose ⇒ symptoms identical to schizophrenia, e.g. hallucinations (Lindström et al., 1999).
- Post-mortem studies: deceased patients' brains have more dopamine receptors. Wise et al. (1974): brain fluid had abnormally low levels of the enzyme that breaks down dopamine ⇒ dopamine probably present in excess.
- PET scans (gamma cameras detect radioactive tracer e.g. glucose; accumulates in active areas): more receptors in striatum, limbic system, cortex in schizophrenia ⇒ linked to positive symptoms. Nestler (1997): decreased dopamine activity in prefrontal cortex ⇒ negative symptoms e.g. flattened affect.
C. Psychological — Cognitive (Frith, 2015)
Accepts biology contributes to positive symptoms, but no single genetic/structural/biochemical cause found ⇒ looks for faulty mental processes. Schizophrenia = abnormality of self-monitoring.
- Hallucinations: patients fail to recognise perceived voices are inner speech ⇒ attribute them to an external source. Test: decide if items read aloud were said by themselves, an experimenter or a computer. Patients with incoherent speech did worst ⇒ linked to memory & attention difficulties crucial for self-monitoring.
- Delusions: misinterpretation of perception – self-generated thoughts seem external and get built into beliefs (logical reasoning applied to hallucinations) ⇒ delusions of alien control, auditory hallucinations, thought insertion. Inability to monitor others' intentions ⇒ paranoia & incoherence.
- Negative symptoms (e.g. avolition): difficulty generating spontaneous actions ⇒ hard to decide what to do without a prompt (can answer a question – a stimulus – but struggles to start a conversation). Partly due to impaired theory of mind (recognising intentions of others). Flat affect, lack of speech, social withdrawal ⇒ difficulty monitoring own mental states and others'.
④ Treatment & management of schizophrenia
Hard to treat: complex, many symptoms across all areas of functioning; usually positive + negative together. Patients may need help for acute episodes (period of active psychotic symptoms e.g. hallucinations/delusions) and help with independent living.
A. Biochemical — Antipsychotics
Before the 1950s (before dopamine was identified) no treatment – patients just hospitalised hoping for improvement. 1950s: antipsychotics developed → reduce dopamine activity ⇒ reduce symptoms. Usually the first treatment after diagnosis, continued alongside psychological therapy (e.g. CBT).
| Typical (1st generation) | Atypical (2nd generation) | |
|---|---|---|
| Developed | 1950s | 1990s |
| Example | chlorpromazine | clozapine |
| How it works | dopamine antagonists – block dopamine receptors (must block a considerable proportion of dopamine activity) | block dopamine but rapidly dissociate (block only briefly) ⇒ normal dopamine transmission can still happen |
| Symptoms treated | mainly positive (hallucinations, delusions) | positive AND negative; effective for treatment-resistant patients |
| Side effects | many & can be severe: extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) and tardive dyskinesia (TD) – affect motor control, involuntary spasms & abnormal movements of face/body | lower risk, less severe: weight gain, drowsiness, difficulty concentrating |
- Evidence (RCTs, often double-blind placebo controlled): ~50% show significant improvement after 4–6 weeks; 30–40% partial improvement; a substantial minority little/no improvement.
- Relapse (symptoms return) rates are high. Patients told to keep taking medication after acute episodes (even in remission – at lower doses). But side effects + fewer symptoms ⇒ non-adherence to medication (stopping against the doctor's instructions).
B. Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT)
- History: inducing seizures used for hundreds of years. 1930s – mistaken belief that schizophrenia was very rare in epileptics ⇒ first ECT trials. Cerletti & Bini saw the effect of electric shocks on cattle ⇒ used on humans, but with no anaesthetic or anti-anxiety drugs patients were traumatised, some broke bones.
- Modern ECT: pass electricity through the brain to induce a seizure – the seizure is the 'treatment', not the electricity. Course of 6–12 sessions, ~twice a week (less often later to prevent relapse). Now applied unilaterally to the non-dominant hemisphere (not bilateral) ⇒ ↓ memory loss.
- Risks: affects central nervous & cardiovascular systems (dangerous with pre-existing medical conditions); memory loss common (usually temporary); rarely lasting neurological damage or death.
- No agreed explanation of why it works – maybe affects post-synaptic responses to CNS transmitters.
- Use: rarely used – no evidence it beats antipsychotics. Can work in acute episodes (fast, short-term improvement of severe symptoms); maybe best for catatonic symptoms (NICE, 2015). Still controversial.
C. Psychological — Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT)
Combines cognitive + behaviourist principles; departs from strict focus on observable behaviour to recognise invisible cognitive processes. A talking therapy – recognise & challenge the thoughts underlying behaviours to change them. Almost always used alongside antipsychotics – drugs first to stabilise the patient enough to engage in therapy.
- Aim: is CBT itself effective, rather than just the experience of talking to others?
- Sample: 90 patients, aged 16–60, diagnosed treatment-resistant schizophrenia (from several UK clinics ⇒ fairly representative). Randomly allocated ⇒ independent groups design. Mean 19 sessions of CBT or 'befriending' (informal chats on hobbies, sports, current affairs = control).
- Procedure: delivered by 2 experienced nurses; CBT in stages (engage, discuss emergence of disorder, then tackle specific symptoms). e.g. for auditory hallucinations: joint critical analysis challenging beliefs about the nature & origin of voices; voice diaries; coping strategies.
- Measures: standardised, validated scales – CPRS (Comprehensive Psychiatric Rating Scale) & SANS (Scale for Assessment of Negative Symptoms) – by blind raters (didn't know group) before, at end (up to 9 months) and at 9-month follow-up.
- Results: immediately after treatment both groups had sig. reduction in positive + negative symptoms. At 9-month follow-up improvement remained in CBT but no longer evident in befriending.
- Conclusion: CBT effective for reducing positive + negative symptoms; benefits continue ≥ 9 months after treatment ends.
Schizophrenia — Quick questions (textbook)
- Q1: predictors of persecutory ideation in VR (Freeman) ⇒ high interpersonal sensitivity + high anxiety (not thoughts about avatars / not gender).
- Q2: twin studies: genetic influence but never 100% ⇒ environment also matters ⇒ supports an interactionist view in the nature vs nurture debate; adoption studies help separate the two.
- Q3: explanation that fits antipsychotics best ⇒ the dopamine hypothesis (drugs reduce dopamine activity).
6.2 Mood (Affective) Disorders
Depressive disorder (unipolar) and bipolar disorder
① Diagnostic criteria (ICD-11)
Mood disorders = episodes of particular types of mood over time (depressive, manic, mixed, hypomanic). Episodes are not diagnosable on their own – they are the main components of mood disorders. Episodic mood disorder = episodes where mood is either very low or very high.
- Depressive episode – ≥ 2 weeks; depressed mood or lack of interest in usual activities for most of the day, nearly every day. Others: sleep/appetite changes, worthlessness, guilt, hopelessness, difficulty concentrating, suicidal thoughts.
- Manic episode – ≥ 1 week; extreme mood (usually euphoric, also irritable), high activity/energy, rapid speech, impulsivity, reckless behaviour, extremely high self-esteem.
- Mixed episode – mixture / rapid alternation of manic + depressive states on most days during a 2-week period.
- Hypomanic episode – less extreme manic: several days of persistent elevated mood / irritability + ↑ activity/energy.
Depressive disorder (unipolar)
Depressed mood (sad, irritable, empty) or loss of pleasure + symptoms affecting function (poor concentration, worthlessness/guilt, recurrent thoughts of death, changes to eating/sleeping). Diagnosis only if the person has never had a manic, mixed or hypomanic episode (that would mean bipolar).
- Single-episode: one depressive episode, no previous history.
- Recurrent: ≥ 2 depressive episodes separated by several months without significant mood disturbance.
Bipolar disorders
| Type 1 | Type 2 | |
|---|---|---|
| Defined by | ≥ 1 manic or mixed episode | ≥ 1 hypomanic episode + ≥ 1 depressive episode |
| Behaviour | extreme euphoria / irritability, high activity, rapid speech, impulsivity, reckless behaviour, v. high self-esteem | lesser versions (↑ talkative, ↑ self-esteem, impulsive); different from usual but NO marked impairment |
| Note | manic/mixed often alternate with depressive episodes | no history of manic or mixed episodes |
② Measure: Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
21-item self-report; measures attitudes & symptoms of depressive disorder; one of the most widely used tools. Each item = ≥ 4 statements; choose the one that best fits how you felt over a recent period (past week or two weeks, depending on version).
e.g. (Beck, 1979): "I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to" (0) · "I don't enjoy things the way I used to" (1) · "I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore" (2) · "I am dissatisfied and bored with everything" (3)
Other items: guilt, hopelessness, fatigue, weight loss. Updated twice – current BDI-II (1996) adds increase/loss of appetite & fatigue.
③ Explanations of mood disorders
Many factors: environmental (e.g. trauma) and biological (genes, brain chemistry).
A. Biological — Biochemical
- Dopamine – signals for motivation & pleasure. Low dopamine ⇒ low motivation/pleasure = core symptoms of depression. Evidence: low dopamine often found in depression; anti-depressants reduce symptoms by increasing dopamine.
- Serotonin – regulates sleep, appetite, mood, anxiety. Normal levels ⇒ balanced. Low ⇒ low mood, anxiety, disrupted sleep & eating. Evidence: most common anti-depressants are SSRIs, which ↑ serotonin.
- Bipolar: serotonin, dopamine and noradrenaline linked to onset. Levels too high / too low ⇒ disorder.
B. Biological — Genetic
First-degree relatives share 50% of DNA. Evidence suggests some genetic explanation for depression + bipolar. Bipolar = one of the most likely to be inherited: genetic factors up to 80% of the cause – but little understanding of which genes (complex inheritance patterns + difficulty with precise diagnoses – McGuffin et al., 1994). Strategy: look at neurotransmitters involved, work back to genes (e.g. serotonin genes).
Oruč, Verheyen, Furac, Jakovljević, Ivezić, Raymaekers & Broeckhoven (1997). American J. of Medical Genetics, 74(5), 504–506.
Aim: do the genes encoding certain serotonin receptors & serotonin transporters affect susceptibility to bipolar disorder? Context: biological + psychological triggers (relationship breakdown, bereavement, physical illness, sleep disturbance); serotonin, dopamine, noradrenaline linked.
- Sample: 42 unrelated patients with bipolar type 1 from 2 Croatian hospitals (25 F, 17 M, age 31–70). 16 had a first-degree relative with a major affective disorder (from participants + family, confirmed via medical records). Control group: 40, no personal/family psychiatric history – matched pairs (age + sex).
- Procedure: DNA testing for polymorphisms (gene variations) in a serotonin receptor gene and serotonin transporter gene – chosen because alterations disturb biochemical pathways linked to depressive disorders. Results compared between participants.
- Results: no sig. associations overall – patients not sig. more likely to have polymorphisms than controls; those with family history no more likely either. BUT serotonin is sexually dimorphic ⇒ analysed by gender: polymorphisms in both genes more common in women with bipolar than control women.
- Conclusion: polymorphisms may raise bipolar risk in females only.
Strength: DNA analysed in lab with automated equipment ⇒ ↑ validity, no researcher bias. Weaknesses: small sample size (genetic studies need large samples; females-only finding needs bigger sample) · some controls young enough to develop bipolar later ⇒ age = extraneous variable. Application: relatives of someone with bipolar could be screened / given advice on early signs. Determinism vs free will: we can't change our DNA ⇒ removes free will; but only small susceptibility in females ⇒ other (maybe non-genetic) causes too.
C. Psychological — Beck's cognitive theory of depression
Negative views of someone with depression form a reality for them (even if far-fetched). Cause of low mood & physiological symptoms = incorrect information processing ("cognitive distortion" = negative bias). Develops from negative experiences in childhood ⇒ negative schemas (units of knowledge about the world that underlie reasoning, memory, perception). When faced with events, the schema is activated ⇒ expect things to turn out badly ⇒ emotional, cognitive & behavioural symptoms.
- Self: unpleasant experiences attributed internally – I'm worthless, incapable of being happy.
- World: presents insurmountable obstacles; external forces misinterpreted as being against me.
- Future: negative – anticipates failure or rejection in any future task.
D. Psychological — Learned helplessness & attributional style
Basis of attributional (explanatory) style. Attribution = how we explain causes of behaviour/events (can be faulty/biased). Difficult upbringing / parental loss ⇒ more likely to perceive lack of control ⇒ negative attributional style:
| Negative style = … | meaning | e.g. team loses a match |
|---|---|---|
| Internal | "it's my fault" | "I played badly" |
| Stable | "it will last forever" | "we'll always lose" |
| Global | "affects every area of life" | "I'm bad at everything" |
- Sample: 39 unipolar + 12 bipolar patients (during a depressive episode), same outpatient clinic, mix of genders, mean age 36; vs non-clinical control group.
- Procedure: short-form BDI (severity) → Attributional Style Questionnaire (12 hypothetical good + bad events: state the cause, then rate it on a 7-point scale for internality, stability, globality).
- Results: both patient groups had more pessimistic attributional styles than controls (blamed themselves, saw negatives as permanent & global). The higher the BDI, the worse the pessimism. In unipolar patients having cognitive therapy, improved attributional style correlated with improved BDI.
- Conclusion: attributional style is an important mechanism in unipolar depressive disorder.
Limitation: correlational ⇒ can't show cause & effect – maybe improved symptoms change attributional style, or a third factor (e.g. effective treatment) affects both. Questionnaires are valid & reliable standardised tools.
④ Treatment & management of depressive disorder
A. Biological — Anti-depressant drugs
| Tricyclics | MAOIs | SSRIs | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introduced | 1950s | 1950s (effective by then) | more recent |
| How | ↑ norepinephrine & serotonin by stopping reabsorption | inhibit monoamine oxidase (breaks down norepinephrine, serotonin, dopamine) ⇒ they stay at higher levels | selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors – stop serotonin being reabsorbed & broken down after crossing the synapse ⇒ ↑ serotonin |
| Side effects | drowsiness, nausea & vomiting, blurred vision, weight gain | headaches, drowsiness/insomnia, nausea, diarrhoea, constipation; withdrawal problems; interact with other meds (pain meds, other anti-depressants) ⇒ high blood pressure, headaches | fewer & less severe than MAOIs/tricyclics |
| Use today | effective, but usually only when other treatments have failed | only when other anti-depressants / treatments unsuccessful | most commonly prescribed in most countries |
- Fewer side effects = ↑ quality of life and patients less likely to stop ⇒ more likely to continue ⇒ drug more effective. Different individuals respond to different drugs.
- Evidence: many large clinical studies: all three beat placebos. Fournier et al. (2010): impact far more noticeable in moderate-to-severe depression than in mild.
- Research methods: well-controlled experiments, large samples ⇒ highly replicable.
B. Psychological — Beck's cognitive restructuring
Aims to gain "entry into the patient's cognitive organisation" (Beck, 1979). One-to-one talking therapy using questioning to identify illogical thinking and discussing ways to change it. Steps:
- Explain the theory (the cognitive triad) so the patient understands how their thinking about self/world/future contributes.
- Train to observe & record thoughts – catch automatic, dysfunctional thoughts (practised outside sessions, in real-life context).
- Link thoughts ↔ affect ↔ behaviour – each influences the others.
- 'Reality testing' – challenge: is this thought an accurate reflection of reality? Use reattributing: is the cause of problems/failures internal or external? ⇒ reframe, realise they're not responsible.
- Aim: patient can do cognitive restructuring themselves ⇒ fewer depressive symptoms.
C. Psychological — Ellis's rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT)
Based on stoicism (philosophy: individual not directly affected by external things but by their own perception of them). Ellis (1962): people get depressed because of internal constructions – perceptions & attitudes to what happens. People with negative, fixed, irrational beliefs are at greater risk.
- Goal: create & maintain constructive, rational patterns of thinking; change thoughts leading to guilt, self-defeat, self-pity or negative behaviour (avoidance, withdrawal, addiction).
- Method – 'disputing': therapist forcefully questions irrational beliefs using many methods ⇒ reformulate dysfunctional beliefs. Client sees consequences (C) are only partly due to the event (A); holding negative beliefs (B) is destructive but can be changed by replacing with healthier thoughts.
- Ellis: holding irrational beliefs is ingrained over time ⇒ REBT focuses on the present (little interest in past, unlike psychoanalysis).
- Lyons & Woods (1991): meta-analysis of 70 REBT outcome studies, 236 comparisons with baseline/controls/other psychotherapies ⇒ REBT sig. better than baseline & controls. Iftene et al. (2015): REBT as effective as anti-depressants.
Mood disorders — Quick questions (textbook)
- Q4 (BDI useful?) ✓ quantitative, reliable, tracks improvement ✗ self-report, can't capture what depression is really like, culture bias.
- Q5 why do two family members share a disorder? ⇒ not just genes: shared environment (trauma, bereavement, upbringing, learned helplessness / negative attributional style).
- Q6 lost football match: negative style ⇒ "it's my fault (internal), we'll always lose (stable), I'm useless at everything (global)"; positive style ⇒ "bad luck today, next time will differ".
6.3 Impulse Control Disorders
① Diagnostic criteria (ICD-11)
Characterised by the repeated inability to resist an impulse/urge to carry out a behaviour that feels rewarding in the short term but has long-term negative consequences (harm to self/others, distress about the behaviour, significant impairment in family, friendships, work). Three to know: kleptomania · pyromania · gambling disorder.
| Disorder | Key criteria |
|---|---|
| Kleptomania | powerful, hard-to-resist impulse to steal ⇒ often steals. Before: intense tension / affective arousal; during/immediately after: excitement, gratification or relief. Stealing not for monetary gain, sabotage or revenge. No other obvious explanation (other behavioural/mental disorder, substance use, intellectual impairment). |
| Pyromania | powerful, hard-to-resist impulse to set fires ⇒ many acts/attempts of setting fire to property/objects. Increasing tension just before; pleasure, excitement or gratification during, straight after, and while witnessing/participating in the aftermath. Fascination / preoccupation with fire & related stimuli (watching/building fires, firefighting equipment). No intelligible motive (money, sabotage, revenge) & no other explanation. |
| Gambling disorder | pattern of persistent/recurrent gambling, online or offline: ① impaired control (time spent, money spent) ② gambling takes priority over other activities/interests ③ continues or increases despite negative consequences. Significant distress/impairment (family, friends, work). Usually present ≥ 1 year (shorter if all criteria met & symptoms severe). |
② Measure: Kleptomania Symptom Assessment Scale (K-SAS)
11-item self-rated scale of impulses, thoughts, feelings & behaviours about stealing, over the past 7 days. Each item rated 0–4 or 0–5 (0 = no symptoms; 4/5 = severe, frequent/enduring). Higher score = greater severity & duration.
③ Explanations
A. Biological — Dopamine (reward deficiency syndrome)
Dopamine = the 'happy' chemical; released by rewarding stimuli. Stealing stimulates reward centres ⇒ dopamine release. When behaviours become compulsive, dopamine levels in the striatum (reward & behavioural control) are reduced ⇒ deficiency ⇒ need to keep doing the behaviour ⇒ more stealing. = 'reward deficiency syndrome' (Comings & Blum, 2000) – may explain other addictions.
- Evidence: kleptomania as a side-effect of synthetic dopamine (for Parkinson's); gambling disorder & compulsive shopping appear alongside these drugs.
- Methods: brain scans (PET / fMRI = tracks oxygenated blood flow to active areas) are scientific & objective – see what's active, no subjective interpretation/self-report ⇒ ↑ validity & reliability.
B. Psychological — Behavioural: positive reinforcement
Positive reinforcement (operant conditioning) = behaviour followed by a reward (money, attention) ⇒ more likely to be repeated. e.g. birthday scratch card wins ⇒ buy more scratch cards.
Why gamblers keep playing despite losing: schedules of reinforcement – partial reinforcement (no reward every time, e.g. fruit machine pays ~1 in 500 plays) ⇒ player never fully satisfied & mistakenly believes they'll make back losses "if I play just one more time".
C. Psychological — Cognitive: Miller's feeling-state theory (2010)
Underlying thoughts about behaviours explain obsessions. Intense positive feelings become linked to specific behaviours (gambling, fire-setting) forming a 'state-dependent memory' = feeling-state (all sensations, emotions, thoughts, physiological arousal e.g. ↑ heart rate, adrenaline).
- e.g. fire-setting feeling-state: "I am a powerful human being" + positive emotions + arousal + memory of setting the fire ⇒ compulsion to set fires. States persist over time so even early positive feeling-states can affect later behaviour.
- Normal behaviours in moderation become problematic only because of fixated, intense feeling-states. An underlying negative thought (e.g. "I'm weak/unimportant") makes the feeling-state during the act highly desirable. Then more negative beliefs when behaviour goes out of control (harmful consequences).
| Belief type (Table 6.3) | Example |
|---|---|
| negative belief about self/world | 'I'm a loser' |
| positive belief during event (e.g. gambling) | 'I'm a winner' |
| negative belief from out-of-control behaviour | 'I mess up everything' |
④ Treatment & management
A. Biological — Opiate antagonists
Drugs traditionally used for substance abuse; block the reward centres activated by drug/alcohol (and by gambling) ⇒ ↓ urge, extends abstinence. e.g. nalmefene, naltrexone. Work well for alcohol dependence with strong cravings, family history of alcoholism and euphoric response (O'Brien, 2005; Monterosso et al., 2001). Alcohol dependence is genetically linked to pathological gambling (PG) and the two often co-occur.
Grant, Kim, Hollander & Potenza (2008). Psychopharmacology, 200(4), 521.
Context: psychological therapies (covert sensitisation, imaginal desensitisation) change thoughts; drug therapy is biological. Kim et al. (2001): opiate antagonists can work for PG but 10–30% don't improve ⇒ individual differences – yet no research on predictors of outcome.
Aim: identify clinical variables associated with treatment outcome. Hypotheses: family history of alcoholism + stronger gambling urges ⇒ positive response to opiate antagonists; less severe PG ⇒ more likely to respond to placebo.
- Design: two double-blind placebo clinical trials (16 and 18 weeks), 284 patients with PG who had gambled in the last 2 weeks; ~equal men/women; all USA. Independent groups, random allocation to 4 conditions – trial 1: placebo or nalmefene 25 / 50 / 100 mg/day; trial 2: placebo or naltrexone 50 / 100 / 150 mg/day. ≈ 25% got placebo (control); neither patient nor investigator knew who had which.
- Measures: clinician-administered scales + semi-structured interviews. Main = PG-YBOCS (Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale modified for pathological gambling; 7-day gambling urges/thoughts + behaviour). Also scales for psychological functioning, anxiety, depression; interviews for family history (esp. first-degree relatives with alcoholism).
- Response = ≥ 35% reduction in PG-YBOCS total score for ≥ 1 month.
- Results: strongest variable for positive response = family history of alcoholism (⇒ maybe a genetic influence on response). Higher dose ⇒ positive response. Placebo group: younger age ⇒ more positive response (urges less ingrained). Contrary to expectations, less severe PG did not respond more to placebo.
- Conclusion: family history of alcoholism + strong gambling urges predict a positive response to opiate antagonists.
Evaluation: ✓ double-blind ⇒ removes participant/researcher bias, ↑ validity · quantitative, objective measure ⇒ easy to compare improvement via standardised Y-BOCS. ✗ ethical: placebo = deceiving participants; some don't receive real drug ⇒ health risk – but participants are told they may get placebo and give consent. Application: shows who benefits most ⇒ faster successful treatment; more research needed on genetic/other factors.
B. Psychological (cognitive-behavioural therapies)
Change distortions in thoughts/feelings to bring about behavioural change. Two therapies:
- Participant: 56-year-old woman, 14-year history of daily shoplifting, sought help. Began after husband convicted of embezzlement; she found it hard to forgive him, became isolated from friends, took a low-status job, became depressed. Compulsive thoughts of shoplifting – repulsive but impossible to resist; no purposeful gain (e.g. stole baby shoes with no baby to give them to).
- Treatment: imagery of nausea & vomiting paired with stealing. 4 sessions at two-weekly intervals; first 2 used muscle relaxation (relieves tension via medication, visualisation or calming phrases) to immerse in the visualisation. Nausea visualisation ↑ each session – imagined vomiting as she lifted the item, with attention & disgust from others. Practised each morning as 'homework'. Last session: imagined sickness going away as she replaced the item and walked away.
- Result: learned to associate vomiting sensations with stealing. 19-month check-up: ↓ desire, avoids stealing, 1 relapse; reported ↑ self-esteem & social life.
Strength: in-depth qualitative data. Weaknesses: case study ⇒ can't generalise (one person, one disorder – may not work for other impulse control disorders); follow-up timing; therapist assesses the patient ⇒ possible bias; a longer-term review could check relapse.
- Therapist teaches progressive muscle relaxation (tense/relax body parts in turn).
- Client visualises a trigger situation (e.g. gambler imagines coming back from a long stressful day at work).
- Imagines acting on the impulse (to gamble), then mentally leaves the situation – all in a state of relaxation, without acting on the impulse.
- Sessions often audio-recorded to practise outside therapy.
Effective in several studies: reduces strength of compulsive drive by reducing psychological + physiological arousal. Gambling disorders: sig. ↓ arousal & anxiety linked to gambling impulses even at a 5-year follow-up; clients feel better able to control impulses.
Impulse control — Quick questions (textbook)
- Q7 gambling conflicts: social (lose friends, secrecy), family (money lost, arguments, trust), occupational (late/absent, can't concentrate, job loss).
- Q8 K-SAS: ✓ quick, quantitative, reliable, tracks change ✗ self-report/shame ⇒ under-reporting, no detail.
- Q9 dopamine = correlation, not proven cause – can't say for certain reduced dopamine causes impulse disorders (could be the result of the behaviour, or a third factor).
6.4 Anxiety & Fear-Related Disorders
① Diagnostic criteria (ICD-11)
Excessive fear and anxiety + related behavioural disturbances; severe enough for significant distress / impairment (family, social, occupational). Fear = response to perceived imminent threat in the present; anxiety = focused on anticipated threat in the future. Disorders are told apart mainly by the specific stimulus.
| Disorder | Key criteria |
|---|---|
| Generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) | marked anxiety on most days for at least several months. General apprehension or worry about multiple everyday events (health, family, finances, work). Muscular tension, sleep disturbance, difficulty concentrating, irritability. Not due to another medical condition/substance. |
| Agoraphobia | excessive fear/anxiety in situations where escape might be difficult or help unavailable (public transport, crowds, outside home alone). Afraid of panic attacks or embarrassing symptoms in public ⇒ situations avoided or endured with extreme distress. Persists several months. |
| Specific phobia (blood-injection-injury, BII) | excessive fear/anxiety consistently when exposed to / anticipating the sight of blood, injection or injury. Disproportionate to actual danger; stimulus avoided or endured with intense fear. Persists several months. |
② Measures
39 participants diagnosed with BII phobia + control matched on age & gender; all did BIPI + Fear Questionnaire (FQ) (agoraphobic fear, social anxiety, BII phobia). Aims: can BIPI discriminate BII from non-BII? Is blood phobia one-dimensional or influenced by many stimuli (cognitive, biological, behavioural)? Can BIPI detect change after therapy? Results: BIPI had excellent reliability & internal consistency, good concurrent validity with FQ blood-phobia subscale, discriminated diagnosed vs not, and was sensitive to therapeutic improvement (scores ↓ after treatment).
③ Explanations
A. Biological — Genetic
We're born prepared to fear certain objects – stimuli posing a survival threat; genetic set-up to avoid them, transmitted through DNA.
- Sample: 81 with blood phobia, 59 with injection phobia, compared with others with different specific phobias (animal, dental, claustrophobia). Screening clinical interview + self-report on history & impact of phobia.
- Behavioural tests: blood phobia – 30-min silent colour video of surgery; told to keep eyes open as long as they could; experimenter tracked gaze; if they looked away or stopped the video ⇒ test ended. Injection phobia – 'live' 20-step test from cleaning the fingertip to a fingertip prick; at each step say OK or not (if 'no', test ended). Measures: % performance, experimenter's rating of fainting (0–4), self-rated anxiety (0–10), thoughts questionnaire, blood pressure & heart rate (fainting linked to BP/HR changes).
- Results: ~50% of blood phobics had ≥ 1 parent with blood phobia; injection phobia: 27% had a parent; ~21% of blood phobics had a sibling. History of fainting: 70% (blood) & 56% (injection) – much higher than other phobias.
- Conclusion: strong genetic link for these phobias – more likely than other phobias to produce a strong physiological response (fainting).
vs case studies: Öst more objective (standardised tests + interviews), larger groups ⇒ more generalisable, better control. ✗ cross-sectional – didn't consider individual experiences in depth.
B. Psychological — Behavioural (classical & operant conditioning)
Classical conditioning explains how a phobia starts: a harmless stimulus paired with a frightening experience, e.g. agoraphobia after being mugged in public.
- Participant: healthy, normal 9-month-old infant 'Albert'. Shown a white rat, rabbit, dog, monkey, masks, cotton wool, burning newspaper – reacted normally, no fear.
- Procedure: metal bar struck loudly with a hammer behind his head (UCS) ⇒ fear/crying (UCR). Neutral stimulus = white rat. When he reached for the rat, bar struck ⇒ distress. Repeated over several trials a week later.
- Result: eventually just seeing the rat (CS) ⇒ fear (CR): crying, trying to move away. Also showed fear of a rabbit ⇒ generalisation to similar animals/items. ⇒ fear can be learned by classical conditioning.
Operant conditioning explains how it persists. Negative reinforcement = ↑ likelihood of repeating a behaviour because something unpleasant is removed. Avoiding the phobic stimulus reduces fear ⇒ rewarding ⇒ avoidance repeats.
Meeting other (harmless) ducks could act as counterconditioning – but avoidance prevents this.
C. Psychological — Psychodynamic (Freud)
Anxiety/fear result from impulses of the id, esp. when denied/repressed. Phobias = one way this internal conflict shows up. Sources of conflict arise at different psychosexual stages; the phobic object symbolises the conflict typical of that stage.
- Hans: 5-year-old Austrian boy; his father referred the case and gave most of the detail (Freud met Hans ≤ 2 times).
- Background: at 3 intense interest in his penis, played with himself ⇒ mother threatened to cut it off ⇒ upset, fear. Around then his sister was born, mother separated from him in hospital; he witnessed a horse fall and die in the street ⇒ horse phobia (afraid of being bitten by a white horse).
- Father linked it to horses' large penises. Conflict emerged with father, who stopped Hans getting into his parents' bed in the mornings. Phobia lessened by age 5. Two fantasies: ① he had several children of his own and his father was his grandfather; ② a plumber removed his penis and replaced it with a bigger one.
- Freud's interpretation: horse = father (white horse with black noseband ⇒ moustached father). Anxiety = castration fear (mother's threat) + banishment from parents' bed ⇒ supports the Oedipus complex.
Determinism: genetic (close relative with blood phobia ⇒ at risk ⇒ no free will), behaviourist (association made ⇒ phobia develops) and psychodynamic (unresolved childhood conflict) are all deterministic. But no gene is near 100% predictive, not everyone who has a fearful experience develops a phobia, and unresolved-conflict evidence is unscientific & retrospective ⇒ can't predict onset.
④ Treatment & management
A. Behavioural therapy: systematic desensitisation
Reduces undesirable responses to particular situations (esp. phobias e.g. agoraphobia). Assumes nearly all behaviour is a conditioned response – if a phobia can be learned (Little Albert) it can be unlearned = counterconditioning.
- Teach relaxation – progressive muscle relaxation, visualisation, or even anti-anxiety drugs.
- Build an anxiety hierarchy together – list of anxiety-provoking situations of ↑ severity, unique to the individual (Table 6.6 below).
- Work up the hierarchy: start in vitro (imagined) then in vivo (real-life exposure). At each stage stay calm/relaxed; don't move on until no anxiety at the current stage.
- Evidence: effective for agoraphobia (Agras, 1967) & fear of snakes (Kimura et al., 1972). Declined in popularity since 1970s–80s – more direct forms of exposure now more common.
- Application: non-drug treatment; skills reusable ⇒ long-term solution; improves quality of life.
Chapman & DeLapp (2014). Nine session treatment of a BII phobia with manualized CBT: an adult case example. Clinical Case Studies, 13(4), 299–312.
Context: CBT effective for specific phobias (Antony et al., 2001) – challenge irrational thoughts, replace with rational ones ⇒ behavioural/emotional change. But BII needs more than fear reduction: BII ⇒ ↑ likelihood of fainting (blood pressure drops). Applied tension = tensing muscles to raise blood pressure ⇒ avoid fainting during e.g. phlebotomy (taking blood). Aim: can BII phobia be treated with CBT + applied muscle tension?
- Design: case study of 'T', 42-year-old white male with BII. Interviews for detailed life history (deaths of family members, living with an anxious grandmother who used a scanner listening to emergency calls, seeing relatives faint at medical procedures). Questionnaires: BAI (Beck Anxiety Inventory), BDI, Q-LES-Q (life satisfaction), BISS (Blood-Injection Symptom Scale – confirms BII criteria). Also diagnosed with major depressive disorder (recurrent, in full remission, from an episode in college).
- Treatment: 9 sessions CBT + applied muscle tension. Educated on how common phobias are; made a fear hierarchy; rated anxiety on SUDS (Subjective Unit of Discomfort Scale, 0–100) at each exposure stage.
- Results: before: severe anxiety, minimal depression, good health otherwise; intense fear of blood/injections; passed out at phlebotomy. During therapy he did every hierarchy stage without SUDS going too high. Ended with blood taken (SUDS 40/100 initially, then soon 'nothing') with only minimal applied tension. At 4, 10 and 12 months he'd attended several medical appointments; anxiety much lower; no fear of medical stimuli, "never felt better".
- Conclusion: BII successfully treated with CBT + applied muscle tension; sustained ≥ 12 months.
Strengths: in-depth detail; quantitative (BAI, BDI, Q-LES-Q, BISS) + qualitative (interviews) data; pre/post comparison. Weaknesses: can't generalise or replicate (one person ⇒ ↓ usefulness); all self-report ⇒ social desirability, subjective interpretation, retrospective misremembering ⇒ ↓ validity. Application: treating BII matters for health – avoiding medical care is serious (unlike e.g. phobia of the sea).
6.5 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD)
① Diagnostic criteria (ICD-11)
Persistent obsessions or compulsions, or most commonly both.
| Obsessions (Table 6.7) | Compulsions |
|---|---|
| fear of deliberately harming oneself · fear of illness/infection · fear of harming/killing others · fear of accidentally injuring self/others · strong desire for order & symmetry | frequent & excessive handwashing · putting things in order (labels facing same way) · checking repeatedly (oven 20 times) · repeating words to oneself / counting |
- Charles: 14-year-old with OCD; spent 3+ hours a day showering + ≥ 2 hours dressing; elaborate routines (holding soap in one hand, putting it under water, switching hands). Mother contacted Rapoport after ~2 years. Previously a good student (loved science); had to leave school (rituals made him late). Had been in/out of hospital; already tried standard medication, behavioural therapy, psychotherapy.
- Obsessed with something sticky on his skin that must be washed off; mother helped him clean his room, kept things he touched clean with rubbing alcohol; one friend only; rituals left little time to leave the house.
- Drug trial of clomipramine (an anti-depressant) gave effective relief (could pour honey!). But after a year he developed tolerance (body gets used to a drug ⇒ response reduces ⇒ less effective). Relapsed to ritual washing/dressing.
Useful: shows impact of compulsions on normal functioning, and unique obsessive thoughts ('stickiness').
② Measures
| MOCI (Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory) | Y-BOCS (Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale) | |
|---|---|---|
| Format | 30 items, true / false; ~5 min; self-report | semi-structured interview (~30 min) + checklist of obsessions/compulsions (Table 6.8) + 10-item severity scale |
| Measures | checking, washing, slowness, doubting; score 0–30 | time spent, how hard to resist, distress caused; score 0–40; > 16 = clinical range |
| Purpose | quick assessment for clinicians & researchers – not a formal diagnostic tool | widely used – measures nature + severity; plan treatment / monitor progress |
| Example | "I frequently have to check things (gas, water taps, doors) several times" (checking) · "I do not take a long time to dress" (slowness) | categories: aggressive, contamination, sexual, hoarding, religious, symmetry, body-focused / cleaning, washing, checking, repeating, counting, ordering, hoarding |
③ Explanations
A. Biological — Biochemical
- Dopamine ↑: people with OCD tend to have abnormally high dopamine. Szechtman et al. (1998): ↑ dopamine in rats ⇒ repetitive movements mirroring compulsions.
- Serotonin ↓: lower than normal. Supported by anti-depressants that ↑ serotonin (SSRIs) being more effective than those with less effect on serotonin (Pittenger & Bloch, 2014).
- Oxytocin ('love hormone' – trust, attachment, but also ↑ distrust & fear of threats): mixed evidence. Leckman et al. (1994): some forms of OCD related to oxytocin dysfunction (cerebrospinal fluid + patient accounts). Contrasting: den Boer & Westenberg (1992) – double-blind placebo-controlled study of 12 OCD patients: half got syntocinon (synthetic oxytocin) nasal spray daily, half placebo ⇒ no reduction in obsessions/compulsions ⇒ no link.
B. Biological — Genetic
- Monzani et al. (2014): large twin study ⇒ concordance MZ 52% vs DZ 21% ⇒ heritability ≈ 48%.
- Ozaki et al. (2003): mutation of the SERT gene (⇒ lower serotonin) in 6 members of 2 unrelated families with OCD.
- Mattheisen et al. (2015): 1406 OCD patients + general population ⇒ genes PTPRD and SLITRK3 implicated (both interact to regulate synapses).
- No definitive answer on which genes – but OCD runs in families and is more concordant in MZ than DZ twins ⇒ some genetic influence.
C. Psychological — Cognitive (thinking error)
OCD = cognitive obsessions + behavioural compulsions. Obsessive thinking is based on faulty reasoning (Rachman, 1977), e.g. belief that hands covered in germs could kill. Errors worsen under stress. Compulsions = outcome of such erroneous thinking – attempts to relieve unwanted thoughts and the anxiety they cause.
D. Psychological — Behavioural (operant conditioning)
Handwashing alleviates the obsession (temporarily) ⇒ negative reinforcer (relieves something unpleasant – the worry) and positive reinforcer (the person is 'rewarded' by having clean hands) ⇒ compulsive behaviours are learned.
E. Psychological — Psychodynamic
Unconscious beliefs & desires. OCD = internal conflict between id and ego, arising in the anal stage (~toilet training). Tension between child and parents who want to control how/when the child defecates/urinates. To regain control:
- anally expulsive – child soils themselves ⇒ upset, arguments;
- anally retentive – child fears harsh parental responses, holds in faeces/urine.
Individual becomes 'fixated' at this stage ⇒ id thoughts disturb the rational ego ⇒ compulsive cleaning & tidying rituals later, to deal with earlier childhood trauma.
④ Treatment & management
A. Biological — SSRIs
Range of drug therapies (anti-depressants, anti-anxiety meds). SSRIs most used: block serotonin from being reabsorbed after a message passes between neurons ⇒ serotonin stays higher. Work with or without depression; they seem to lessen the anxiety associated with OCD. Higher dosage than for depression is more effective (Pampaloni et al., 2009).
B. Psychological — Exposure & response prevention (ERP)
A form of CBT. Person is exposed to stimuli that provoke obsessions + distress while being helped to prevent the compulsive behaviour. e.g. touch a door handle ⇒ dirt/germs obsession + urge to wash ⇒ don't wash; tolerate anxiety, accept the obsession, become habituated (get used to it). Key: prevent the compulsion as a response to the obsession ⇒ learn the uncomfortable feelings go away eventually without performing the compulsion.
- Jason, 12, with OCD + autism spectrum disorder (high-functioning, normal IQ). (≈ 2% of children with ASD also have OCD; hard to tell ASD rituals from OCD compulsions – but cleaning/checking/counting common in OCD.) Contamination fear, excessive handwashing, counting, checking; hours a day of compulsions; significant anxiety if stopped.
- Treatment: 10 × 50-min CBT sessions over 16 weeks, ERP modified for ASD (no visualisation – he found it impossible to imagine pretend situations). ① identified distress feelings + learned coping statements ("I know nothing bad will happen…") ② exposure to 'contaminated' stimuli (door handles, elevator buttons) – touch repeatedly until habituated, increasingly difficult ③ practised between sessions (handing out papers in class, 'contaminated' items at home).
- Results: Y-BOCS 18 → 3 (normal range); at 3-month follow-up still low; Jason + parents reported big improvement in OCD symptoms & in school/social participation.
Evaluate: ✓ in-depth understanding of ERP; quant (Y-BOCS) + qual (interviews). ✗ limited generalisability (Jason also had ASD ⇒ not representative of OCD sufferers); ethical issues – briefing, consent, risk of psychological harm (child with additional needs).
C. Psychological — CBT
Same principles as before (understand then challenge irrational thoughts ⇒ positive change in emotional + behavioural responses). NICE research shows CBT very effective for OCD – but traditionally face-to-face, 45–60 min weekly for several weeks ⇒ expensive, time-consuming ⇒ long waiting lists (OCD may worsen while waiting ⇒ harder to treat). Attempts to improve access: computerised CBT, facilitated self-help, telephone CBT (↑ use – Mohr et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2003: effective & cheaper).
Lovell, Cox, Haddock, Jones, Raines, Garvey… & Hadley (2006). Telephone administered CBT for treatment of OCD: randomised controlled non-inferiority trial. British Medical Journal, 333(7574), 883.
Benefits of phone CBT: shorter sessions ⇒ ↓ waiting lists & pressure on resources; more accessible (no transport/cost, easier around work/family; OCD sufferers may find travel to a new place anxiety-provoking). Aim: compare CBT by telephone vs face to face for OCD. Hypothesis: outcomes similar for both.
- Design: RCT, independent measures (random allocation). ERP delivered by traditional 60-min face-to-face sessions or shorter telephone sessions (≤ 30 min). 10 weekly sessions each.
- Sample: 72 OCD patients, aged 16–65, all UK, 2 outpatient clinics; all scored ≥ 16 on Y-BOCS (self-report version); no substance misuse or other conditions like severe depression.
- Controls: 2 experienced therapists (one per clinic, did both types); therapist manuals, fortnightly supervision, 4-monthly training days ⇒ consistency. Assessors did not know which condition (no bias).
- Measures: assessed twice pre-treatment (4 weeks apart) with Y-BOCS + BDI; then immediately after, and at 1, 3, 6 months; client satisfaction questionnaire.
- Results: mean pre-treatment Y-BOCS = 25 (marked severity); no sig. difference between groups pre-treatment. At all four time points clinical outcome equivalent. 'Clinically relevant' = Y-BOCS drop of ≥ 2 SD: 72% overall (77% telephone, 67% face-to-face). Satisfaction very high & similar.
- Conclusion: CBT by telephone is equivalent to face-to-face – with less contact time.
Strengths: independent measures + random allocation ⇒ no researcher bias; face-to-face group = control to compare telephone vs standard; same therapy duration; validated scales ⇒ ↑ validity & reliability; standardised (manuals, supervision); assessors blind.
Weaknesses: relatively small sample, all UK ⇒ limited generalisability · self-report ⇒ may exaggerate/downplay symptoms ⇒ ↓ validity.
Application to real life: a cheaper, more accessible alternative equally effective ⇒ NHS funds stretch further (less contact time), easier for patients (even those who can't leave home), shorter waiting lists. Debate – biological vs psychological: this study only compares psychological treatments. Psychological = deal with the source, reusable skills, patient takes responsibility; biological = quicker, easier, cheaper (more appealing).
Q15: no third 'no therapy' group because unethical to withhold treatment from patients who need it (and aim was to compare two active delivery methods).
7. Revision Summary
Explanations at a glance
| Disorder | Biological | Psychological |
|---|---|---|
| Schizophrenia | genetic (Gottesman 1991, Hilker 2017 – 79%, Tienari 2000) · dopamine hypothesis (↑ DA ⇒ +ve; ↓ prefrontal DA ⇒ −ve) | cognitive – Frith: abnormal self-monitoring |
| Mood | dopamine & serotonin (+ noradrenaline in bipolar) · genetic (Oruč 1997 – 5-HT genes, females) | Beck's cognitive triad · learned helplessness / attributional style (Seligman 1988) |
| Impulse control | dopamine – reward deficiency syndrome (Comings & Blum 2000) | positive reinforcement (partial reinforcement) · Miller's feeling-state |
| Anxiety / fear | genetic – prepared to fear (Öst 1992) | behavioural: classical (Watson & Rayner 1920) + operant (neg. reinforcement) · psychodynamic (Freud 1909 – Little Hans) |
| OCD | ↑ dopamine, ↓ serotonin, oxytocin (mixed) · genetic (Monzani 52% vs 21%; SERT; PTPRD/SLITRK3) | cognitive (faulty reasoning – Rachman) · behavioural (operant) · psychodynamic (anal stage) |
Treatments at a glance
| Disorder | Biological | Psychological | Key / example study |
|---|---|---|---|
| Schizophrenia | typical & atypical antipsychotics, ECT | CBT | Sensky 2000 (CBT vs befriending, n = 90) |
| Mood | tricyclics, MAOIs, SSRIs | Beck's cognitive restructuring, Ellis's REBT (ABC) | Wiles 2013 · Lyons & Woods 1991 · Iftene 2015 |
| Impulse control | opiate antagonists (nalmefene, naltrexone) | covert sensitisation · imaginal desensitisation | Grant 2008 · Glover 1985 · Blaszczynski & Nower 2003 |
| Anxiety / fear | (anti-anxiety drugs as relaxation aid) | systematic desensitisation, CBT + applied tension | Chapman & DeLapp 2014 · Agras 1967 · Kimura 1972 |
| OCD | SSRIs | ERP, CBT (also by phone) | Lovell 2006 · Lehmkuhl 2008 · Soomro 2008 |
Measures at a glance
| Disorder | Measure | Quick facts |
|---|---|---|
| Schizophrenia | ICD-11 criteria · BSI (Freeman) | ≥ 1 month; BSI 53 items, 9 dimensions |
| Depression | Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) | 21 items; 10 mild, 19–29 moderate, 30+ severe; BDI-II 1996 |
| Kleptomania | K-SAS | 11 items; past 7 days; 0–4/5 |
| GAD / BII | GAD-7 · BIPI | 7 items 0–3 (screening) · 18 situations 0–3 |
| OCD | MOCI · Y-BOCS | 30 true/false, 0–30 · interview + 10-item, 0–40, > 16 clinical |
- Research methods: case study (detail ✓, can't generalise/replicate ✗) · RCT/double-blind (↑ validity, removes bias) · self-report (response bias, social desirability) · control groups · sample size/representativeness · reliability & validity · quant vs qual · longitudinal vs snapshot · meta-analysis
- Issues & debates: nature vs nurture · free will vs determinism · individual vs situational · biological vs psychological treatments · idiographic vs nomothetic · cultural differences · use of children · reductionism
- Application to everyday life: how do findings help real patients / screening / waiting lists / treatment choice?
- Ethics: consent · right to withdraw · debrief · protection from harm · deception (placebo) · children
8. Exam-Style Questions & Pointers
| Q | What it asks | Pointers (from these notes) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Define positive / negative symptom + one example each [2+2] | +ve = 'in addition to'/distortion of normal (delusions, hallucinations, thought disorder, control); −ve = falls below normal (avolition, flat affect) |
| 2 | a) genetic explanation [4]; b) two other explanations, compare [6] | family/twin/adoption + Gottesman/Hilker/Tienari; dopamine vs Frith – both explain positive symptoms; biological = chemical, Frith = faulty mental process |
| 3 | a) Beck's theory [2]; b) learned helplessness + attributional style with a study [4] | negative schemas, triad; internal–stable–global; Seligman 1988 |
| 4 | a) tricyclics, MAOIs, SSRIs [6]; b) compare any two [4] | mechanism + side effects + use today; compare e.g. MAOI vs SSRI side effects & drug interactions |
| 5 | a) criteria for kleptomania, pyromania, gambling [3 each]; b) evaluate K-SAS [4] | tension → relief/gratification, no motive; impaired control, priority, continues despite harm; reliable & valid ✓ self-report ✗ |
| 6 | Grant 2008: sample [2], placebo & why [4], results [2], evaluate [4]; b) one psychological treatment with a study [6] | 284 patients, USA; placebo = inactive control, double-blind; family history of alcoholism; covert sensitisation (Glover) or imaginal desensitisation |
| 7 | determinism vs free will in anxiety explanations [6] | genetic, behaviourist, psychodynamic all deterministic; but no gene 100%, not everyone conditioned develops a phobia |
| 8 | a) explain systematic desensitisation [4]; b) Chapman & DeLapp: aim [2], method [1], strength + weakness of method [4], 2 questionnaires [2], strength + weakness of questionnaires [4] | relaxation + hierarchy + reciprocal inhibition; case study; BAI, BDI, Q-LES-Q, BISS; self-report issues |
| 9 | a) analyse two OCD measures [4]; b) evaluate psychometric tests [6] | MOCI vs Y-BOCS; objective/quantitative ✓ ↓ detail, self-report, nomothetic |
| 10 | a) outline Lovell procedure + findings [4]; b) evaluate Lovell [10] | 72 pts, RCT, telephone vs face-to-face ERP, Y-BOCS 25 → equal outcomes (77% vs 67%); strengths/weaknesses/application/debates |